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Abstract
In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item
second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in
order to maximize their utilities. A number of results indicate that high welfare can be achieved
this way, giving bounds on the welfare at equilibrium. Recently, however, criticism has been
raised that equilibria are hard to compute and therefore unlikely to be attained.
In this paper, we take a different perspective. We study simple best-response dynamics.
That is, agents are activated one after the other and each activated agent updates his strategy
myopically to a best response against the other agents’ current strategies. Often these dynamics
may take exponentially long before they converge or they may not converge at all. However, as
we show, convergence is not even necessary for good welfare guarantees. Given that agents’ bid
updates are aggressive enough but not too aggressive, the game will remain in states of good
welfare after each agent has updated his bid at least once.
In more detail, we show that if agents have fractionally subadditive valuations, natural
dynamics reach and remain in a state that provides a 1/3 approximation to the optimal welfare
after each agent has updated his bid at least once. For subadditive valuations, we can guarantee
an Ω(1/ logm) approximation in case of m items that applies after each agent has updated
his bid at least once and at any point after that. The latter bound is complemented by a
negative result, showing that no kind of best-response dynamics can guarantee more than an
o(log logm/ logm) fraction of the optimal social welfare.
1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete for the assignment of m items. The players have
private preferences over bundles of items as expressed by a valuation function vi : 2
[m] → R≥0.
Our goal in this work is to find a partition of the items into sets S1, . . . , Sn that maximizes social
welfare
∑
i vi(Si), based on reported valuations (bids) bi : 2
[m] → R≥0 with the freedom to impose
payments p1, . . . , pn on the players.
Even if valuations are known, finding an allocation that maximizes social welfare is typically
NP-hard. Furthermore, since valuations are assumed to be private information, some mechanics
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are needed to extract this information. The traditional approach is to incentivize players to bid
truthfully. Insisting on truthfulness has the advantage that for the individual players it is easy
to participate as it is not necessary to act strategically. However, truthfulness requires central
coordination of the entire allocation and payments.
An alternative approach to this problem that is arguably seen more often in practice is to
let players participate in a simpler, non-truthful mechanism and to accept strategic behavior. To
derive theoretical performance guarantees, one then seeks to prove bounds on the so-called Price
of Anarchy, the worst-case ratio between the optimal social welfare and the welfare at equilibrium.
The most prominent example in the context of combinatorial auctions is item bidding, where the
items are sold through separate single-item auctions.
One can show that for pretty general classes of valuations, such as submodular or the even
more general classes fractionally subadditive and subadditive, all equilibria from a broad range
of equilibrium concepts obtain a decent fraction of the optimal social welfare. More recently,
however, these results have been criticized for ignoring the computational complexity of finding an
equilibrium. In fact, by now, there is quite a selection of impossibility results showing that finding
exact equilibria is often computationally intractable.
Our approach in this paper is different. We consider simple, best-response dynamics, in which
players are activated in a round-robin fashion and players when activated buy their favorite set of
items at the current prices, in a myopic way. Christodoulou et al. [7] showed that one instance
of such dynamics converges if players’ valuation functions are fractionally subadditive. However,
they also showed that it takes exponential time. For subadditive valuations, even convergence
cannot be guaranteed because any fixed point would be a pure Nash equilibrium, and pure Nash
equilibria may not exist (see Appendix A). We show that despite possibly long convergence time
or no convergence at all, the social welfare reaches a good level very fast.
1.1 The Setting
We study combinatorial auctions with n bidders N and m items M . Each bidder i ∈ N has a
valuation function vi : 2
M → R≥0. Our objective is to find a feasible allocation, i.e., a partition
of the items, S1, . . . , Sn, that maximizes social welfare
∑
i∈N vi(Si). We assume that an allocation
of items to bidders is found by distributed strategic behavior of the bidders using item bidding.
That is, each bidder i ∈ N places a bid bi,j on each item j ∈ M . Each item j ∈ M is assigned to
the bidder i ∈ N with the highest bid bi,j at a price of pj = maxi′ 6=i bi′,j. Ties are broken in an
arbitrary, but fixed manner.
We assume that bidders choose their bids strategically so as to maximize their quasi-linear
utilities. Bidder i’s utility ui as a function of the bids b = (bi′)i′∈N is ui(b) = vi(S) −
∑
j∈S pj ,
where S is the set of items won by bidder i.
We say that a bid bi is a best response to the bids b−i if bidder i’s utility is maximized by bi.
That is, ui(bi, b−i) ≥ ui(b′i, b−i) for all b′i. Note that any best response must give bidder i a set of
items S that maximizes ui(b) = vi(S)−
∑
j∈S pj. We call these sets of items demand sets. A (pure)
Nash equilibrium in this setting is a profile of bids b = (bi′)i′∈N such that for each bidder i ∈ N his
bid bi is a best response against bids b−i.
We study simple game-playing dynamics in which bidders get activated in turn and myopically
choose to play a best response. More formally, starting from an initial bid vector b0, in each time
step t ≥ 1, some bidder i ∈ N is activated and updates his bid bt−1i from the previous round to a
best response to the other players’ bids bt−i = b
t−1
−i which do not change from the previous to the
current round. The fixed points of such best-response dynamics are Nash equilibria. However, Nash
equilibria do not necessarily exist and even if they do best-response dynamics may not converge.
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We will evaluate best-response dynamics by the social welfare that they achieve. For bid profile
b and corresponding allocation S1, . . . , Sn we write SW (b) =
∑
i vi(Si) for the social welfare at bid
profile b. We seek to compare this to the optimal social welfare OPT (v).
1.2 Variants of Best-Response Dynamics
Since payments in combinatorial auctions with item bidding are second price, there are typically
many ways to choose a best response. Clearly, not all best responses will ensure that good states
(in terms of social welfare) will be reached quickly.
Example 1.1 (Gross Underbidding). Consider a single-item auction with n bidders. Suppose
v1 = C and vi = 1 for i ≥ 2, where C ≫ 1. Suppose we start at b = (0, . . . , 0) and the item
assigned to bidder 1. A possible best response sequence has bidders update their bids in round-
robin fashion, each time increasing the winning bid by ǫ.
Example 1.2 (Gross Overbidding). Consider the same setting as in the previous example. If in
the first round of updates the last bidder bids C + ǫ this will terminate the dynamics.
Note that in both these examples the social welfare after each round of best responses (and on
average) is 1, which can be arbitrarily smaller than the optimal social welfare C.
The issue in each of these examples is as follows. Through the bids bi,j, the bidders effectively
declare additive valuations. The allocation maximizes the declared welfare DW (b) =
∑
i
∑
j∈Si
bi,j,
which usually differs from the actual welfare SW (b). In both examples, there exist update steps
in which the declared utility of the bidder, i.e., uDi (b) =
∑
j∈Si
bi,j −
∑
j∈Si
maxk 6=i bk,j, is very
different from his actual utility. We will prove bounds on the welfare achieved by best-response
dynamics that are quantified by the extent to which declared utilities can differ from the actual
utilities as captured by the following definitions.
Definition 1.3. Let α ≥ 0. We call a bid bi by bidder i against bids b−i α-aggressive if uDi (b) ≥
α ·maxb′
i
ui(b
′
i, b−i).
Definition 1.4. Let β ≥ 1. A bidding dynamic is β-safe if it ensures that uDi (b) ≤ β · ui(b) for all
players i and reachable bid profiles b.
We will usually apply Definition 1.3 when bi is a best response to b−i. However, it also leaves
the freedom to consider approximate best responses. We will see that one way to achieve Definition
1.4 is to require strong no overbidding, but we will also see an example of safe dynamics that allow
overbidding. Note that in both cases players will have non-negative actual utilities at all times
because ui(b
t) ≥ 1β · uDi (bt) ≥ 0 for every bidder i and time step t.
1.3 Our Results
Our first main result is that round-robin best-response dynamics are capable of reaching states
with near-optimal social welfare strikingly fast, despite the fact that convergence to equilibrium
may take exponentially long or they may not converge at all.
In fact, our result applies to any round-robin bidding dynamics, provided that players choose
bids that are aggressive enough but not too aggressive. This, in particular, includes dynamics in
which players choose to play only approximate best responses. Also, their way of making choices
does not need to be consistent in any way.
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Main Result 1. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with α-aggressive bid updates the social
welfare at any time step t ≥ n satisfies
SW (bt) ≥ α
(1 + α+ β)β
· OPT (v).
In other words, once every player had the chance to update his bid, the social welfare, at any
time step after that, will be within α/(1 + α+ β)β of optimal.
For fractionally subadditive valuations and subadditive valuations there exist round-robin best-
response dynamics with (α, β) = (1, 1) and (α, β) = (1/ lnm, 1) respectively. The result for XOS
requires access to demand and XOS oracles [11], the result for subadditive valuations requires access
to demand oracles and that the greedy algorithm for set cover problems can be executed [16, 2].
Our guarantee on the social welfare achieved by best-response dynamics shows that these dy-
namics provide a 1/3 (resp. Ω(1/ logm)) approximation to the optimal social welfare that applies
after a single round of bid updates, and at any time step after that.
We also prove a bound on the average social welfare of 1/2(2 + α)β, which improves upon
the above bound for large β. In particular, for subadditive valuations it is also possible to achieve
(α, β) = (1, lnm). While the point-wise guarantee of this dynamics is only Ω(1/ log2m), its average
social welfare is within Ω(1/ logm) of optimal.
We show that the point-wise welfare guarantee of 1/3 for fractionally subadditive valuations
is tight for the respective mechanism. Our second main result is that the Ω(1/ logm) bounds are
almost best possible in a more general sense.
Main Result 2. For players with subadditive valuations no best-response dynamics in which players
do not overbid on the grand bundle can guarantee a better than o(log logm/ logm) fraction of the
optimal social welfare at any time step.
For round-robin bidding dynamics, this point-wise impossibility result extends to an impossi-
bility for the average social welfare that can be achieved.
The assumption that players do not overbid on the grand bundle is quite natural, and is satisfied
by all dynamics that have been proposed in the literature. It obviously applies to strong no-
overbidding dynamics, but it also applies to dynamics in which players use weak no-overbidding
strategies on the items that they win and bid zero on all other items.
Our proof of the lower bound is based on a non-trivial construction exploiting the algebraic
properties of linearly independent vector spaces. It presents an interesting separation from the
Price of Anarchy literature, where no such lower bound can be proved.
Finally, we explore to which extent our positive results depend on round-robin activation. We
show that our positive results extend to the case where at each step a player is chosen uniformly at
random, while the social welfare can be as low as O(1/n) of optimal when the order of activation
is chosen adversarially.
1.4 Related Work
Best-response dynamics are a central topic in Algorithmic Game Theory. Probably, the best-studied
application are congestion games, where best-response dynamics always converge but, except in
special cases, take worst-case exponential time before they do so [23, 21, 1]. On the other hand,
a number of results show that certain types of best-response dynamics reach states of low social
cost quickly [19, 6, 3, 15, 25]. Some of these results extend to weighted congestion games, where
equilibria may not exist and best-response sequences may not converge for this reason.
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The study of the Price of Anarchy in combinatorial auctions with item bidding was initiated by
Christodoulou et al. [7], and subsequently refined and improved upon in [2, 20, 26, 14, 18]. Some of
these bounds are based on mechanism smoothness, others are not. They provide welfare guarantees
for a broad range of equilibrium concepts ranging from pure Nash equilibria, over (coarse) correlated
equilibria, to Bayes-Nash equilibria. For fractionally subadditive valuations there is a smoothness-
based proof that shows that the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria is at most
2 [7, 26]. For subadditive valuations the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria is
also at most 2 [2], but the best smoothness-based proof gives a bound of O(logm) [2, 26]. In fact,
as shown by Roughgarden [24], combinatorial auctions with item bidding achieve (near-)optimal
Price of Anarchy among a broad class of “simple” mechanisms.
Also relevant to our analysis in this context is that Christodoulou et al. [7] gave a simple, best-
response dynamics for fractionally subadditive valuations, that they called Potential Procedure.
They showed that this procedure always converges to a pure Nash equilibrium, but also that it may
take exponentially many steps before it converges.
Lately, attempts at proving Price of Anarchy bounds for combinatorial auctions with item
bidding have been criticized for not being constructive, in the sense that the computational com-
plexity of finding an equilibrium remained open. Dobzinski et al. [13], for example, showed that for
subadditive valuations computing a pure Nash equilibrium requires exponential communication.
Regarding fractionally subadditive valuations they concluded that “if there exists an efficient al-
gorithm that finds an equilibrium, it must use techniques that are very different from our current
ones.” Further negative findings were reported by Cai and Papadimitriou [5], who showed that
computing a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is PP-hard.
Most recently, Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [8] considered coarse correlated equilibria. They showed
that even for unit-demand players (a strict subclass of submodular) there are no polynomial-time
no-regret learning algorithms for finding such equilibria, unless RP ⊇ NP, closing the last gap in the
equilibrium landscape. However, they also proposed a novel solution concept to escape the hardness
trap, no-envy learning, and gave a polynomial-time no-envy learning algorithm for XOS valuations
and complemented this with a proof showing that for this class of valuations every no-envy outcome
recovers at least 1/2 of the optimal social welfare.
Further relevant work comes from Devanur et al. [9], who proposed an alternative to simul-
taneous second-price auctions, the so-called single-bid auction. This mechanism also admits a
polynomial-time no-regret learning algorithm and by a result of [4] achieves optimal Price of An-
archy bounds within a broader class of mechanisms.
A final point of reference are truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. While no mecha-
nism can achieve a better than 1/m1/2−ǫ approximation for submodular valuations with valuation
queries alone [12], Dobzinski [10] recently managed to improve a long-standing approximation
guarantee of Ω(1/ logm) for submodular valuations to Ω(1/
√
logm) for fractionally subadditive
valuations, requiring access to both value and demand oracles.
2 Achieving Aggressive and Safe Bids
As already discussed, best responses are generally not unique in our settings. Our positive results
require that updates are aggressive and safe. In this section we briefly describe how to guarantee
these properties for fractionally subadditive (a.k.a. XOS) valuations and subadditive valuations.
The missing proofs are provided in Appendix B.
A valuation function is fractionally subadditive, or XOS, if there are values vℓi,j ≥ 0 such that
vi(S) = maxℓ
∑
j∈S v
ℓ
i,j. It is subadditive if for all S, T ⊆M , vi(S ∪ T ) ≤ vi(S) + vi(T ).
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The dynamics that we consider approach players in round-robin fashion. When player i is
activated he picks a demand set D at the current prices and updates his bid as described below.
Note that here we assume eager updating. This assumption leads to cleaner proofs, but is not
necessary as we demonstrate in Appendix G.
2.1 Bid Updates for XOS Valuations
For XOS valuations we can update bids as described by [7]. If D is the demand set chosen by player
i, let (vℓi,j)j∈M be the supporting valuation on this demand set for which
∑
j∈D v
ℓ
i,j = vi(D), and
set bti,j = v
ℓ
i,j for j ∈ D and bti,j = 0 otherwise. Note that these update steps can be performed in
polynomial time using demand and XOS oracles.
Proposition 2.1. Starting from an initial bid vector b0 satisfying strong no-overbidding, the bid
updates described above lead to a sequence of bids b0, b1, b2, . . . that is 1-safe and in which each
update is a 1-aggressive best response.
2.2 Bid Updates for Subadditive Valuations
For subadditive functions, it is generally not possible to guarantee α = 1 and β = 1 at the same
time. We describe two different, reasonable ways of bid updates.
No-Overbidding Updates Given a bid vector b−i, define u˜i(S, b−i) = vi(S)−
∑
j∈Smaxk 6=i bk,j.
That is, u˜i(S, b−i) is the utility bidder i can derive from buying the set S. Observe that u˜i( · , b−i)
is subadditive for every b−i. Let D be an inclusion-wise minimal demand set of bidder i given
b−i. We can show that u˜i(S, b
t
−i) > 0 for all S ⊆ D unless D = ∅. Therefore, by [2] there exists
an additive approximation ai such that (a)
∑
j∈D ai,j ≥ 1/ lnm · u˜i(D, bt−i) and (b)
∑
j∈S ai,j ≤
u˜i(S, b
t
−i) for all S ⊆ D with the property that ai,j > 0 for all j ∈ D. We set bids bti,j = ai,j +
maxk 6=i b
t
k,j for j ∈ D and bti,j = 0 otherwise. These update steps can be performed in polynomial
time with a demand oracle if it is possible to compute the additive approximation, which corresponds
to executing the greedy set-cover algorithm on u˜i( · , bt−i).
Proposition 2.2. Starting from an initial bid vector b0 that satisfies strong no-overbidding, the
bid updates described above lead to a sequence of bids b0, b1, b2, . . . that is 1-safe and in which each
update is a (1/ lnm)-aggressive best response.
Aggressive Updates The basic construction is the same as above except that instead of con-
sidering ai we consider a˜i such that a˜i,j = γ · ai,j for all items j ∈ D, where 0 < γ ≤ lnm is such
that
∑
j∈D ai,j = 1/γ · u˜i(D, bt−i). Note that these bids satisfy: (a)
∑
j∈D a˜i,j = u˜i(D, b
t
−i) and (b)∑
j∈S a˜i,j ≤ γ · u˜i(S, bt−i) for all S ⊆ D.
Proposition 2.3. Starting from an initial bid vector b0 that satisfies strong no-overbidding, the
bid updates described above lead to a sequence of bids that is lnm-safe and in which each update is
a 1-aggressive best response.
3 Welfare Guarantees
In this section we prove our first main result (Theorem 3.1). The theorem provides a point-wise
social welfare guarantee, parametrized in α and β, for round-robin bidding dynamics. It shows that
6
the social welfare is high already after a single round of updates, and remains high at every single
step after that.
Theorem 3.1. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with α-aggressive bid updates the social
welfare at any time step t ≥ n satisfies SW (bt) ≥ α(1+α+β)β · OPT (v).
As we have argued in Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 there exist round-robin best-response
dynamics with (α, β) = (1, 1) for fractionally subadditive valuations and (α, β) = (1/ lnm, 1) for
subadditive valuations. So two corollaries of our theorem are point-wise welfare guarantees of 1/3
and Ω(1/ logm) for the respective mechanisms.
We also show a welfare guarantee for the average social welfare, Theorem 3.2 below, that
improves upon the pointwise guarantee for large β. Note that the term (1 − nT ) is 1 − o(1) for
T ∈ ω(n) and at least 1/2 for T ≥ 2n.
Theorem 3.2. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with α-aggressive bid updates the average
social welfare in the first T steps satisfies 1T
∑T
t=1 SW (b
t) ≥ α(2α+1)β ·
(
1− nT
) ·OPT (v).
This theorem shows that the best-response dynamics described in Proposition 2.3 with (α, β) =
(1, lnm), whose point-wise welfare guarantee is only Ω(1/ log2m) by Theorem 3.1, guarantees an
average social welfare of Ω(1/ logm).
In Appendix C we show that the point-wise welfare guarantee of 1/3 for fractionally subadditive
valuations is tight for the respective mechanism. In Section 4 we show that the Ω(1/ logm) bounds
are essentially best possible in a more general sense.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The core of our proof of the pointwise welfare guarantee are two lemmata. The first (Lemma
3.4) shows that the declared social welfare after a single round of updates is high when the initial
declared welfare is low and the second (Lemma 3.5) shows that the declared welfare after a single
round of updates is high when the initial declared welfare is high. To prove these lemmata we need
the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Consider a sequence b0, . . . , bn in which bidder i updates his bid in step i. Denote
bidder i’s declared utility in step i by uDi (b
i). Then,
∑n
i=1 u
D
i (b
i) ≤ DW (bn).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder i. Bidder i updates his bid in step i. Suppose bidder i’s update
buys him the set of items S′. Then
uDi (b
i) =
∑
j∈S′
(
bii,j −max
k 6=i
bik,j
)
.
For i > 0, let zij = maxk≤i b
i
k,j for all j. That is, z
i
j is the maximum bid on item j that is placed
by one of the bidders 1, . . . , i, z0j = 0 for all j.
The crucial observation is that
∑
j∈S′(b
i
i,j − maxk 6=i bik,j) ≤
∑
j∈M(z
i
j − zi−1j ) . The reason is
as follows. For j 6∈ S′, we have zij ≥ zi−1j by definition. For j ∈ S′, bii,j = zij and maxk 6=i bik,j ≥
maxk<i b
i
k,j = maxk<i b
i−1
k,j = z
i−1
j .
Summing over all players i we obtain
∑
i∈N
uDi (b
i) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(zij − zi−1j ) .
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The double sum is telescoping and znj = maxk b
n
k,j and z
0
j = 0 by definition. So,
∑
i∈N
uDi (b
i) ≤
∑
j∈M
(znj − z0j ) =
∑
j∈M
max
k
bnk,j = DW (b
n) ,
which proves the claim.
With the help of this lemma we can now prove our key lemmata.
Lemma 3.4. Let S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n be any feasible allocation, in which player i receives items S
∗
i . Consider
a sequence b0, . . . , bn in which bidder i updates his bid in step i using an α-aggressive bid. We have
(α+ 1) ·DW (bn) + α ·DW (b0) ≥ α ·∑i∈N vi(S∗i ).
Proof. Consider player i’s action in time step i. Instead of choosing bid bii, he could have bought
the set of items S∗i . As b
i
i is α-aggressive, we get
uDi (b
i) ≥ α ·
(
vi(S
∗
i )−
∑
j∈S∗
i
max
k 6=i
bik,j
)
.
Define ptj = maxi b
t
i,j for all items j. That is, p
t
j is the maximum bid that is placed on item j in
bid profile bt. We claim that for every j ∈ S∗i , maxk 6=i bik,j ≤ pnj + p0j . This is correct because if bik,j
attains its maximum for k < i then maxk 6=i b
i
k,j ≤ pnj as k’s bid on item j will not change anymore.
In the other case, if k > i, then maxk 6=i b
i
k,j ≤ p0j because k has not yet changed the bid on item j.
Using that both p0j and p
n
j are never negative, the bound follows.
We thus have
uDi (b
i) + α ·
∑
j∈S∗
i
(pnj + p
0
j) ≥ α · vi(S∗i ) .
Summing this inequality over all bidders i ∈ N yields
n∑
i=1
uDi (b
i) + α ·
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗
i
(pnj + p
0
j ) ≥ α ·
n∑
i=1
vi(S
∗
i ) .
We can upper bound the first sum by DW (bn) using Lemma 3.3. The double sum adds up
every j ∈M exactly once and we have ∑j∈M pnj = DW (bn) and ∑j∈M p0j = DW (b0). We obtain
(α+ 1) ·DW (bn) + α ·DW (b0) ≥ α ·
n∑
i=1
vi(S
∗
i ) ,
as claimed.
Lemma 3.5. Consider a β-safe bid sequence b0, . . . , bn in which player i changes his bid from bi−1
to bi using an α-aggressive bid. Then, DW (bn) ≥ αβ ·DW (b0).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary bidder i and his update from bi−1 to bi. Denote the set of items that
bidder i won under bids bi−1 by Si−1i , and the set of items that he wins under bids b
i by Sii . So
uDi (b
i−1) =
∑
j∈Si−1
i
bi−1i,j −
∑
j∈Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j and, u
D
i (b
i) =
∑
j∈Si
i
bii,j −
∑
j∈Si
i
max
k 6=i
bik,j .
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Using that for all k 6= i and all j we have bi−1k,j = bik,j we obtain that the difference in declared
welfare over all bidders between steps i − 1 and i is equal to the difference in bidder i’s declared
utility at these time steps. Formally,
DW (bi) =
∑
j∈M\Si
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si
i
bii,j
=
∑
j∈M
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si
i
bii,j −
∑
j∈Si
i
max
k 6=i
bik,j
=
∑
j∈M
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j + u
D
i (bi)
=
∑
j∈M\Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j + u
D
i (bi)
=
∑
j∈M\Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si−1
i
bi−1i,j + u
D
i (bi)−
∑
j∈Si−1
i
bi−1i,j +
∑
j∈Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j
= DW (bi−1) + uDi (bi)− uDi (bi−1) .
We now extend this identity to a lower bound on DW (bi). Since bii is α-aggressive, we have
uDi (b
i) ≥ α · ui(bi−1). Since the bidding sequence is β-safe, uDi (bt) ≤ β · ui(bt) for all t. So,
DW (bi) = DW (bi−1) + uDi (b
i)− uDi (bi−1)
≥ DW (bi−1) + uDi (bi)− β · ui(bi−1)
≥ DW (bi−1) + uDi (bi)−
β
α
· uDi (bi)
= DW (bi−1)−
(
β
α
− 1
)
· uDi (bi) .
Summing this inequality over all bidders i ∈ N and using the telescoping sum∑i∈N (DW (bi)−
DW (bi−1) = DW (bn)−DW (b0) we obtain
DW (bn) ≥ DW (b0)−
(
β
α
− 1
)∑
i∈N
uDi (b
i) .
Since α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 1 the factor (β/α− 1) ≥ 0. We can therefore use Lemma 3.3 to conclude that
DW (bn) ≥ DW (b0)−
(
β
α
− 1
)
DW (bn) ,
which concludes the proof.
We will use our key lemmata to show a lower bound on the declared welfare. To relate the
declared welfare to the social welfare we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. In a β-safe sequence of bid profiles b0, b1, b2, . . . for every t ≥ 0, DW (bt) ≤ β ·SW (bt).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary time step t. Since the bid profile bt is β-safe we know that for the
allocation T1, . . . , Tn that corresponds to b
t,∑
i
uDi (b
t) =
∑
i
∑
j∈Ti
(
bti,j −max
k 6=i
btk,j
)
≤ β ·
∑
i
ui(b) = β ·
∑
i
(
vi(Ti)−
∑
j∈Ti
max
k 6=i
btk,j
)
.
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Rearranging this and using that β ≥ 1 we obtain
DW (bt) =
∑
i
∑
j∈Ti
bti,j ≤ β · SW (bt)− (β − 1)
∑
i
∑
j∈Ti
max
k 6=i
btk,j ≤ β · SW (bt) ,
and the claim follows.
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To prove the guarantee for time step t ≥ n consider the bid sequence of
length n + 1 from bt−n to bt. At time steps t − n + 1 to t each bidder updates his bid exactly
once. By the virtue of being a subsequence of a β-safe bidding sequence the sequence bt−n, . . . , bt
is β-safe. Moreover each bid update is α-aggressive.
Applying first Lemma 3.5 and then Lemma 3.4 with bt taking the role of bn, bt−n taking the
role of b0, and setting S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n to the allocation that maximizes welfare we obtain
(1 + α+ β) ·DW (bt) = (α+ 1) ·DW (bt) + α · β
α
DW (bt)
≥ (α+ 1) ·DW (bt) + α ·DW (bt−n)
≥ α ·OPT (v) .
Now, by Lemma 3.6, DW (bt) ≤ β ·SW (bt). Combining this with the previous inequality yields
(1 + α+ β) · β · SW (bt) ≥ α · OPT (v) ,
as claimed.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
With the proof of the pointwise welfare guarantee at hand we have already done the bulk of the
work for proving our guarantee regarding the average welfare. The basic idea is to sum the lower
bound on the declared welfare at any given time step as provided by Lemma 3.4 over all time steps
to obtain a lower bound on the average declare welfare, and to turn this into a lower bound on the
actual social welfare using Lemma 3.6.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We first use Lemma 3.4 to relate the declared welfare at time steps t and
t− n to the optimal social welfare. Namely, for all t ≥ n,
(α+ 1) ·DW (bt) + α ·DW (bt−n) ≥ α · OPT (v) .
Next we take the sum over all time steps t and use that DW (bt) ≥ 0 to obtain the following
lower bound on the average declared welfare
1
T
·
T∑
t=1
DW (bt) ≥ 1
T
·
T∑
t=n+1
DW (bt)
≥ α
α+ 1
· 1
T
·
T∑
t=n+1
(
OPT (v)−DW (bt−n)
)
≥ α
α+ 1
· T − n
T
· OPT (v)− α
α+ 1
· 1
T
·
T∑
t=1
DW (bt) .
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Solving this inequality for 1T ·
∑T
t=1DW (b
t) and using Lemma 3.6 to lower bound SW (bt) by
1/β ·DW (bt) we obtain
1
T
·
T∑
t=1
SW (bt) ≥ 1
β
· 1
T
·
T∑
t=1
DW (bt) ≥ α
(2α + 1)β
· T − n
T
·OPT (v) ,
which proves the claim.
4 Lower Bound for Subadditive CAs
Next we show our second main result (Theorem 4.1), which shows that no best-response dynamics
in which bidders do not overbid on the grand bundle can achieve a point-wise welfare guarantee
that is significantly better than 1/ logm. The assumption that bidders do not overbid on the grand
bundle seems quite natural, and does allow overbidding on subsets of items. It is satisfied by all
dynamics that we have described in Section 2 and more generally by all dynamics that have been
proposed in the literature.
Theorem 4.1. For every positive integer k ∈ N>0 there exists an instance with n = 2 players,
m = 2k−1 items, and subadditive valuations v = (v1, v2) such that in every best-response dynamics
in which players do not overbid on the grand bundle there exist infinitely many time steps t at which
SW (bt) ≤ 1
Ω
(
logm
log logm
) · OPT (v).
To prove this theorem we show that whenever the second player has updated is bid social
welfare will be low. This does not imply that the average welfare will be low as well. However,
if we restrict attention to round-robin dynamics, then we can extend the construction by adding
additional players after the second player that play a low-stakes game on separate items forcing the
average welfare to be low as well.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Our proof of the lower bound is built around the following family of hard instances, with n = 2
players and m = 2k − 1 items. The valuations of the first player are based on an example that
demonstrates the worst-case integrality gap for set cover linear programs (see, e.g, [27, Example
13.4]), and has been used in the context of combinatorial auctions with item bidding before [2]. The
crux of our construction is in the design of the second player’s valuation function, and its interplay
with the valuation function of the first player.
Definition 4.2. For every positive integer k ∈ N>0 the hard instance Ik consists of n = 2 bidders
and m = 2k − 1 items and the following subadditive valuations:
1. First bidder: Number the items from 1 to m and let i be a k-bit binary vector representing
the integer i. Interpret i as a k-dimensional vector over F2. Write i · j as the dot product of
the two vectors. Let Si = {j | j · i = 1}. Note that each such set contains (m + 1)/2 items,
and each item is contained in (m+ 1)/2 such sets. For each set of items T ⊆M let v1(T ) be
the minimum number of sets Si required to cover the items in T .
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2. Second bidder: Set ρ = 4 km and d = k − log2 k. Let D denote the set of all d-dimensional
subspaces of Fk2 excluding the zero vector. Then for any set of items T let
v2(T ) = ρ ·max
D∈D
wD(T ) , where
wD(T ) =


0 for |T | = 0
|D|
2 for 0 < |T ∩D| < |D|
|D| else
.
Note that, in the instances just described, the first player has a valuation of v1(M) ≥ k =
log2(m+1) for the grand bundle, while the second player has a maximum valuation of maxT v2(T ) =
ρ · |D| = ρ · (2d − 1) ≤ ρ · 2d = 4 for any set of items.
To prove the theorem we first use linear algebra to derive a symmetry property of D, which
together with weak no-overbidding of the first player on the grand bundle implies the existence of
a subset of items D ∈ D with low prices (Lemma 4.3). Intuitively, this is because the sets of items
that the second player is interested in are rather small (of size about m/ log2m), and there are
sufficiently many of these sets. We then show that every demand set of the second player under
these prices includes some set of items D′ ∈ D (Lemma 4.4). In the final step, we show that if the
second player buys any such set D′, then the first player’s valuation for the remaining items M \D′
and hence the overall social welfare is at most O(log logm) (Lemma 4.5).
Lemma 4.3. Let k ∈ N>0. Consider the hard instance Ik. For every vector of bids b such that
the first player does not overbid on the grand bundle there is a d-dimensional subspace D ∈ D such
that
∑
j∈D b1,j < ρ · |D|2 .
Proof. Since the first player does not overbid on the grand bundle we have
∑
j∈M b1,j ≤ v1(M) = k,
so the average bids are bounded by 1m
∑
j∈M b1,j ≤ km .
Observe that the number of d-dimensional subspaces of Fk2 that contain a vector 0 6= x ∈ Fk2 is
given as
(k−1
d−1
)
2
, where
( ·
·
)
q
refers to the q-binomial coefficient (see, e.g., [22]). So, in particular,
this number is independent of x. Therefore, instead of taking the average over all items M , we can
take the average over all sets D ∈ D and take the average within such a set, i.e., 1m
∑
j∈M b1,j =
1
|D|
∑
D∈D
1
|D|
∑
j∈D b1,j .
In combination, there has to be a D such that 1|D|
∑
j∈D b1,j ≤ 1m
∑
j∈M b1,j ≤ km . Since
k
m <
ρ
2 = 2
k
m the claim follows.
Lemma 4.4. Let k ∈ N>0. Consider the hard instance Ik. If the prices p as seen by the second
player are such that
∑
j∈D pj < ρ · |D|/2 for some D ∈ D, then each demand set of the second
player under these prices includes some D′ ∈ D.
Proof. By our assumption on the sum of the prices of the items in D, u(D) = v2(D)−
∑
j∈D pj =
ρ ·wD(D)−
∑
j∈D pj > ρ · |D|2 . Now, let S ⊆M be a demand set under v2. If |S ∩D′| < |D′| for all
D′ ∈ D, then we have u(S) = v2(S)−
∑
j∈S pj ≤ v2(S) = ρ ·maxD′∈D wD′(S) ≤ ρ ·maxD′∈D |D
′|
2 <
u(D). This means, S can only be a demand set if |S ∩D′| = |D′| for some D′ ∈ D.
Lemma 4.5. Let k ∈ N>0. Consider the hard instance Ik. Then for D′ ∈ D we have v1(M \D′) ≤
k − d.
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Proof. To show the bound on v1, we use thatD
′∪{0} is a subspace of Fk2 of dimension d. That is, any
basis x1, . . . , xd of D
′ ∪{0} can be extended by xd+1, . . . , xk to a basis of Fk2 . Let X = (x1, . . . , xk).
This way, X−1 is the matrix that expresses j ∈ Fk2 as a linear combination of x1, . . . , xk. As
x1, . . . , xd is a basis of D
′ ∪ {0}, we know that for every j 6∈ D′ ∪ {0} the vector X−1j cannot be
zero in all components d+ 1, . . . , k. This implies that the set M \D′ can be covered by sets Si for
i being the rows d+ 1, . . . , k of X−1. Therefore v1(M \D′) ≤ k − d.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Any best-response dynamics has to ask every bidder infinitely often. We
claim that the social welfare is O(log logm) right after each update of the second player. Since the
optimal social welfare is Ω(logm) this shows the claim.
Let bt be a bid vector after the second player has made a move. Using Lemma 4.3, we know
that there is a set D ∈ D with ∑j∈D bt−11,j < ρ · |D|2 . By Lemma 4.4, the second player then buys
a superset of some D′ ∈ D. Therefore, right after the second player has updated his bid the first
player is allocated a subset of the items M \D′. Lemma 4.5 implies that the social welfare for this
allocation is no higher than k − d+ ρ2d = O(log logm).
5 Beyond Round-Robin Activation
Our positive results make use of the fact that bidders are activated to update their bid in round-
robin fashion. That is, between two activations of a bidder, each other bidder is activated exactly
once. In this section, we investigate alternative activation protocols.
5.1 Randomized Activation
We first show that our positive results extend to the case where at each step a random player gets
to update his bid.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a β-safe sequence of bids that is generated by choosing at each time step
a player uniformly at random and letting this player update his bid to an α-aggressive bid. Then
for any time step T ≥ n, E [SW (bT )] ≥ α2(1+4α)β · OPT (v).
The key difference to the previous positive results is as follows. In the case of round-robin
activation, we could bound the price that a bidder has to pay for an item j at any time by the
sum of the maximum bid before the first and after the n-th step. As now, in the case of random
activation, a bidder can potentially be activated multiple times during the first n steps, this is not
true anymore. Instead, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Consider a sequence of bids that is generated by choosing at each time step a player
uniformly at random and letting this player update his bid. Then, for all items j ∈ M and all
lengths of the sequence T ≥ 0, we have
E
[
max
t≤T
max
i
bti,j
]
≤
(
1− 1
n
)−T
E
[
max
i
bTi,j
]
.
The proof can be found in Appendix D. The overall idea is to bound the probability that a
bidder who causes a high bid is activated again. Using this lemma, we can follow a similar pattern
as when proving Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Since all of our arguments apply starting from any vector of bids, we can
without loss of generality assume that T is the final of a sequence of n bid updates, and so T = n. Let
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N ′ be the set of players that are selected to bid at least once during this sequence of bid updates.
Denote by S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n the allocation that maximizes social welfare. By a variant of Lemma 3.4,
which does not make use of round-robin activation and is given as Lemma D.1 in Appendix D, we
have
DW (bT ) + α
∑
j∈M
max
t≤T
max
i
bti,j ≥ α
∑
i∈N ′
vi(S
∗
i ) .
Note that DW (bT ), maxt≤T maxi b
t
i,j, and N
′ are now random variables. Taking expectations of
both sides, we get
E
[
DW (bT ) + α
∑
j∈M
max
t≤T
max
i
bti,j
]
≥ E
[
α
∑
i∈N ′
vi(S
∗
i )
]
.
By linearity of expectation, this implies
E
[
DW (bT )
]
+ α
∑
j∈M
E
[
max
t≤T
max
i
bti,j
]
≥ α
∑
i∈N
Pr
[
i ∈ N ′] vi(S∗i ) .
The probability of each player to be selected at least once is Pr [i ∈ N ′] = 1−(1− 1n)T . Lemma 5.2
shows that E
[∑
j∈M maxt≤T maxi b
t
i,j
]
≤ (1− 1n)−T E [DW (bT )].
We obtain
(
1 + α
(
1− 1
n
)−T )
E
[
DW (bT )
] ≥ α
(
1−
(
1− 1
n
)T )
·
∑
i∈N
vi(S
∗
i ) ,
and therefore
E
[
DW (bT )
] ≥ α · 1−
(
1− 1n
)T
1 + α
(
1− 1n
)−T ·
∑
i∈N
vi(S
∗
i ) .
Finally, we use Lemma 3.6 to relate the declared social welfare to the actual social welfare and
the fact that T = n ≥ 2 to lower bound 1 − (1 − 1/n)n ≥ 1/2 and upper bound (1 − 1/n)−n ≤ 4.
This yields,
E
[
SW (bT )
] ≥ α
2(1 + 4α)β
·OPT (v) .
5.2 Adversarial Activation
We conclude by showing that our positive results that show quick convergence to states of high
welfare no longer apply if an adversary chooses the order in which players get to update their bids.
Our result concerns XOS valuations, and 1-safe bidding sequences in which each bid update is to a
1-aggressive best response. It applies even if players update their bids as in the Potential Procedure
of [7]. That is, unless the activated player already plays a best response, he chooses an arbitrary
demand set and bids his supporting additive valuation on the respective set and zero on all other
items.
Theorem 5.3. For every ǫ > 0, n, and k, there is an instance with n agents with XOS valuations
and (n−1) ·(k+1) items, an initial bid vector b0, and an activation sequence such that, even if each
activated agent updates his bid as in the Potential Procedure, until each agent has been activated
Ω(2k) times the welfare has never exceeded a 1+ǫn−1 fraction of the optimum.
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At the core of our proof (in Appendix E) is the following proposition that applies even if players
have unit-demand valuations, i.e., a player’s valuation for a set of items is the maximum value for
any item in the set. It shows the existence of a cyclic activation pattern in which each player gets
to update his bid, but the dynamic remains in states of low welfare. The construction assumes
that players also update their bid if this does not strictly improve their utility, and that ties among
multiple best responses are broken in our favor.
Proposition 5.4. For every ǫ > 0 and n, there is an instance of n agents with unit-demand
valuations for n − 1 items, an initial bid vector b0, and a cyclic activation pattern in which every
agent is activated at least once and bid updates are as in the Potential Procedure except that updates
need not be strict improvements and ties among multiple best responses are broken in our favor, but
the social welfare is always at most a 1+ǫn−1 fraction of the optimal welfare.
Proof. There are n bidders and n − 1 items. Player i’s valuation for a set S ⊆ M is given as
vi(S) = maxj∈S vi,j. For bidder 1, we let v1,1 = . . . , v1,n−1 = 1 + ǫ. For bidder i > 1, define
vi,i−1 = 1 and vi,j = 0 for j 6= i − 1. The social optimum assigns item j to bidder j + 1 and has
welfare n− 1.
In the initial bid vector b0 all players bid zero. The activation scheme is as follows: In every
odd step bidder 1 makes a move, while in even steps bidders i > 1 are activated in a round-robin
way. That is, the activation works repeatedly as 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 4, . . . , 1, n − 1, 1, n.
With this activation order, it’s possible that bidder 1 bids 1 + ǫ on item t the t-th time he is
activated, while bidders i > 1, when activated, see a bid of 1 + ǫ on the item they are interested
in, and therefore bid 0 on all items. This way the social welfare at any time step t ≥ 1 is 1+ ǫ.
Our proof in the appendix combines this construction with several copies of the exponential
lower-bound construction of Theorem 3.4 in [7], and thus ensures that each update is a strict
improvement and unique.
6 Concluding Remarks and Outlook
In our analysis we focused on fractionally subadditive and subadditive valuations, which do not
exhibit complements. A natural question is whether similar results can be obtained for classes
of valuations that exhibit complements. In Appendix F, we discuss an example with MPH-k
valuations [17] that highlights the difficulties that arise. Another interesting follow-up question is
whether there is a general result that translates a Price of Anarchy guarantee for a given mechanism
that is provable via smoothness into a result that shows that best-response sequences reach states of
good social welfare quickly. The example with MPH-k valuations in Appendix F already limits the
potential scope of such a result. It would still be interesting to identify natural sufficient conditions.
One such condition could be that the mechanism admits some kind of potential function (as the
procedure for XOS valuations), but our results already show that this condition is certainly not
necessary.
References
[1] H. Ackermann, H. Ro¨glin, and B. Vo¨cking. On the impact of combinatorial structure on
congestion games. Journal of the ACM, 55(6), 2008.
15
[2] K. Bhawalkar and T. Roughgarden. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item
bidding. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
SODA’11, pages 700–709, 2011.
[3] V. Bilo`, A. Fanelli, M. Flammini, and L. Moscardelli. Performance of one-round walks in linear
congestion games. Theory of Computing Systems, 49(1):24–45, 2011.
[4] M. Braverman, J. Mao, and S. M. Weinberg. Interpolating between truthful and non-truthful
mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM-SIAM Sym-
posium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA’16, pages 1444–1457, 2016.
[5] Y. Cai and C. H. Papadimitriou. Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational com-
plexity. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’14,
pages 895–910, 2014.
[6] G. Christodoulou, V. S. Mirrokni, and A. Sidiropoulos. Convergence and approximation in
potential games. Theoretical Computer Science, 438:13–27, 2012.
[7] G. Christodoulou, A. Kova´cs, and M. Schapira. Bayesian combinatorial auctions. Journal of
the ACM, 63(2):11, 2016.
[8] C. Daskalakis and V. Syrgkanis. Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy. In
Proceedings of the 57th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 219–
228, 2016.
[9] N. R. Devanur, J. Morgenstern, V. Syrgkanis, and S. M. Weinberg. Simple auctions with simple
strategies. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC’16,
pages 305–322, 2015.
[10] S. Dobzinski. Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with sub-
modular bidders. In Proceedings of the 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
STOC’16, pages 940–948, 2016.
[11] S. Dobzinski and M. Schapira. An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auc-
tions with submodular bidders. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM-SIAM Sym-
posium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA’06, pages 1064–1073, 2006.
[12] S. Dobzinski and J. Vondra´k. Impossibility results for truthful combinatorial auctions with
submodular valuations. Journal of the ACM, 63(1):5, 2016.
[13] S. Dobzinski, H. Fu, and R. D. Kleinberg. On the complexity of computing an equilibrium in
combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms, SODA’15, pages 110–122, 2015.
[14] P. Du¨tting, M. Henzinger, and M. Starnberger. Valuation compressions in VCG-based com-
binatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics,
WINE’13, pages 146–159, 2013.
[15] B. Farzad, N. Olver, and A. Vetta. A priority-based model of routing. Chicago Journal of
Theoretical Computer Science, 2008, 2008.
[16] U. Feige. On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive. In Proceedings of the
38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC’06, pages 41–50, 2006.
16
[17] U. Feige, M. Feldman, N. Immorlica, R. Izsak, B. Lucier, and V. Syrgkanis. A unifying
hierarchy of valuations with complements and substitutes. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI’15, pages 872–878, 2015.
[18] M. Feldman, H. Fu, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient.
In Proceedings of the 45th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, STOC’13,
pages 201–210, 2013.
[19] M. X. Goemans, V. S. Mirrokni, and A. Vetta. Sink equilibria and convergence. In Proceedings
of the 46th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS’05, pages 142–154,
2005.
[20] A. Hassidim, H. Kaplan, Y. Mansour, and N. Nisan. Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete
goods. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC’11, pages
295–296, 2011.
[21] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 14(1):
124–143, 1996.
[22] A. Prasad. Counting subspaces of a finite vector space — 1. Resonance, 15(11):977–987, 2010.
[23] R. W. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. International
Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):65–67, 1973.
[24] T. Roughgarden. Barriers to near-optimal equilibria. In 55th IEEE Annual Symposium on
Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS’14, pages 71–80, 2014.
[25] T. Roughgarden. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy. Journal of the ACM, 62(5):32,
2015.
[26] V. Syrgkanis and E´. Tardos. Composable and efficient mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 45th
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing Conference, STOC’13, pages 211–220, 2013.
[27] V. V. Vazirani. Approximation Algorithms. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., New York, NY,
USA, 2001. ISBN 3-540-65367-8.
A Non-Existence of Weak No-Overbidding Pure Nash Equilibria
for Subadditive Valuations
We can also leverage our novel insights regarding hard instances (Definition 4.2) for subadditive
valuations to show that there need not be a pure Nash equilibrium, even if players are only required
to use weakly no-overbidding strategies.
Theorem A.1. Let k ∈ N>0. Consider the hard instance Ik with n = 2 players and m = 2k − 1
items. There is no pure Nash equilibrium in weakly no-overbidding strategies if k ≥ 8. This remains
true if we define a bid profile to be at equilibrium if no player has a beneficial deviation to a weakly
no-overbidding strategy.
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Proof. Assume that b is a weakly no-overbidding pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose the second player
wins the set of items W ⊆ M in b, then the first player wins the set of items M \W . By weak
no-overbidding, we have ∑
j∈M\W
b1,j ≤ v1(M \W ) and
∑
j∈W
b2,j ≤ v2(W ) .
The first player does not win the items in W , which means that b1,j ≤ b2,j for all items j ∈W .
Consequently, we have ∑
j∈M
b1,j ≤ v1(M \W ) + v2(W )
≤ v1(M) + v2(M)
= k + ρ · 2d
= k + 4 · k
m
· 2k−log2 k
= k + 4 .
By the same argument as in Lemma 4.3, each item j ∈ M is included in the same number of
sets D ∈ D. Therefore,
1
|D|
∑
D∈D
1
|D|
∑
j∈D
b1,j =
1
m
∑
j∈M
b1,j ≤ k + 4
m
.
This implies that there is a set D ∈ D such that
1
|D|
∑
j∈D
b1,j ≤ k + 4
m
.
Since k ≥ 8 by assumption, m > 2k + 8, and therefore
∑
j∈D
b1,j ≤ k + 4
m
· |D| < |D|
2
.
By Lemma 4.4 and because the second player plays a best response, we have W ⊇ D′ for some
D′ ∈ D.
In the remainder, we will show that this implies that the first player has a beneficial weakly
no-overbidding deviation b′1.
Let b′1,j = b2,j +
1
m for j ∈ W and b′1,j = b1,j for j ∈ M \W . Observe that in (b′1, b2) the first
player wins all items M . This bid fulfills the weak no-overbidding property because
∑
j∈M
b′1,j =
∑
j∈W
(
b2,j +
1
m
)
+
∑
j∈M\W
b1,j
≤ v2(W ) + 1 + v1(M \W )
≤ v2(D′) + 1 + v1(M \D′)
≤ ρ2d + 1 + k − d
= 4 + 1 + log2 k
≤ k
= v1(M) ,
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where the first inequality uses that b is weakly no-overbidding, the second inequality exploits the
definition of v2, the third inequality holds by Lemma 4.5, and the final inequality holds because we
have assumed k ≥ 8.
The deviation by the first player is beneficial because
u1(b
′
1, b2) = v1(M)−
∑
j∈M
b2,j
= k − d−
∑
j∈M\W
b2,j + d−
∑
j∈W
b2,j
≥ u1(b) + d− v2(W )
≥ u1(b) + d− 4 > u1(b) ,
where the first inequality uses Lemma 4.5, the second inequality uses that v2(W ) ≤ v2(D′) = 4,
and the final inequality follows from the definition of d = k− log2 k and the assumption that k ≥ 8
and so d > 4.
B Missing Proofs from Section 2
In this appendix we prove the propositions that establish the existence of aggressive and safe bidding
dynamics for XOS and subadditive valations.
B.1 Sufficiency of Strong No-Overbidding
We first show that in order to have a 1-safe dynamic it suffices that initial bids and the subsequent
updates fulfill no-overbidding in the strong sense. A bid vector b satisfies strong no-overbidding if∑
j∈S bi,j ≤ vi(S) for every bidder i and every set of items S. A best response bi by bidder i against
bids b−i satisfies strong no-overbidding if
∑
j∈S bi,j ≤ vi(S).
Lemma B.1. If the initial bid vector b0 satisfies strong no-overbidding and at each time step t ≥ 1
some bidder i gets to update his bid to a best response, which satisfies strong no-overbidding, then
the resulting best-response dynamic is 1-safe.
Proof. Since the initial bid vector and each update satisfy strong no-overbidding we have∑
j∈S b
t
i,j ≤ vi(S) for all bidders i, time steps t ≥ 0, and sets of items S. Subtracting∑
j∈Smaxk 6=i b
t
k,j from both sides shows the claim.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Consider an arbitrary bidder i and his update to bid bti. The bid b
t
i satisfies strong no-overbidding
by definition. Hence Lemma B.1 shows that the bid sequence is 1-safe. It remains to show that bti
is a 1-aggressive best response.
We first show that the bid bti is a best response to b
t
−i. Let Si denote the set of items that
bidder i wins with bid bti against bids b
t
−i and let D be the demand set on the basis of which b
t
i is
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defined. Then,
ui(b
t) = vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
max
k 6=i
btk,j ≥
∑
j∈Si
(bti,j −max
k 6=i
btk,j)
≥
∑
j∈D
(bti,j −max
k 6=i
btk,j) = vi(D)−
∑
j∈D
max
k 6=i
btk,j
≥ max
S
(
vi(S)−
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
btk,j
)
,
where the first inequality uses that vi is XOS, the second uses that maxk 6=i b
t
k,j = b
t
i,j for j ∈ D \Si
and maxk 6=i b
t
k,j ≤ bti,j for j ∈ Si \ D, the following equality exploits the definition of bti, and the
final inequality uses that D is a demand set.
To show that bti is 1-aggressive it suffices to show that bidder i’s declared and actual utility
at time step t coincide. Since the right-hand side in the preceding chain of inequalities is at least
vi(Si) −
∑
j∈Si
maxk 6=i b
t
k,j all inequalities in the chain of inequalities must be equalities. This
implies that
ui(b
t) = vi(Si)−
∑
j∈Si
max
k 6=i
btk,j =
∑
j∈Si
(bti,j −max
k 6=i
btk,j) = u
D
i (b
t) .
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Consider an arbitrary bidder i and his update to bid bti. We first argue that b
t
i is a best response.
We claim that u˜i(S, b
t
−i) > 0 for all S ⊆ D unless D = ∅. To see this assume by contradiction that
there exist a S ⊆ D such that u˜i(T, bt−i) ≤ 0. Then, by subadditivity of vi,
u˜i(D, b−i) ≤
(
vi(D \ T )−
∑
j∈D\T
max
k 6=i
bk,j
)
+
(
vi(T )−
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bk,j
)
≤ u˜i(D \ T, bt−i) ,
which contradicts the definition of D. Because of this the additive approximation ai has ai,j > 0
for all j ∈ D. It follows that bti,j > maxk 6=i btk,j for all j ∈ D, and so bidder i wins all items j ∈ D,
and for the items j 6∈ D that he wins maxk 6=i btk,j = 0.
To see that bti is 1/ lnm-aggressive observe the following. Let Si denote the set of items that
bidder i wins with bid bti. Then, considering the bid b
t
i defined on the basis of demand set D, we
have
uDi (b
t) =
∑
j∈Si
(
bti,j −max
k 6=i
btk,j
)
≥
∑
j∈D
(
bti,j −max
k 6=i
btk,j
)
=
∑
j∈D
ai,j ≥ 1
lnm
· u˜i(D, bt−i) ,
where the first inequality uses that bti,j = maxk 6=i b
t
k,j for j ∈ D \ Si and bti,j ≥ maxk 6=i btk,j for
j ∈ Si \D, and the second inequality uses property (a) of bid bti.
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That the bid sequence is 1-safe follows from the starting condition and Lemma B.1 by observing
that bidder i’s update satisfies strong no-overbidding. Namely, for every S ⊆ D,
∑
j∈S
bti,j =
∑
j∈S
(ai,j +max
k 6=i
btk,j) ≤ u˜i(S, bt−i) +
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
btk,j = vi(S) ,
where the inequality follows from property (b) of bid bti.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
The argument that the bid bti chosen by bidder i is a best response and 1-aggressive is identical to
the respective argument in the proof of Proposition 2.2, except that this time we collect a factor
of 1 instead of 1/ lnm when we apply property (a) of bid bti.
To see that the bid sequence is lnm-safe, consider a point in time t′ ≥ t after bidder i’s update.
In the vector bt′ , bidder i gets a set S ⊆ M that is possibly different from D. Note that for
j ∈ S \D, bt′i,j = 0 by our definition. Furthermore, for j ∈ S ∩D, maxk 6=i bt
′
k,j ≤ maxk 6=i btk,j because
bid updates are only non-zero if an item changes its owner. Therefore, because bidder i wins item
j, all new bids have to be zero.
In combination, we have
uDi (b
t′) =
∑
j∈S∩D
(
a˜i,j +max
k 6=i
btk,j −max
k 6=i
bt
′
k,j
)
≤ lnm ·
(
u˜i(S ∩D, bt−i) +
∑
j∈S∩D
(
max
k 6=i
btk,j −max
k 6=i
bt
′
k,j
))
= lnm · ui(bt′) ,
because the sum of a˜i,j terms is bounded by lnm · u˜i(S ∩D, bt−i) by definition and the sum of the
remaining terms is non-negative.
C Tightness of the Point-Wise Welfare Guarantee for XOS Valu-
ations
The following proposition shows that the point-wise welfare guarantee of 1/3 for the round-robin
best-response dynamics for fractionally subadditive valuations described in Section 2 is tight, even
if the valuations are unit demand.
Proposition C.1. Consider the dynamics described in Section 2.1. There is an input with n = 3
players, m = 3 items, and unit-demand valuations and an initial bid vector such that when started
from this bid vector the social welfare obtained by the dynamics after a single round of bid updates
is 1/3 · OPT (v).
Proof. The valuations of all three bidders are unit demand, i.e., for all players i and sets of items
S, vi(S) = maxj∈S vi,j. The item valuations vi,j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3 are given by the following table:
item 1 item 2 item 3
player 1 1 0 0
player 2 1 + ǫ 1 + 2ǫ 1 + 3ǫ
player 3 0 0 1
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Suppose that the XOS representation of these valuations is that each player has an additive
valuation ai,0 that is all zero and then one for each item j, ai,j, such that ai,j(k) = vi,j for k = j
and ai,j(k) = 0 otherwise.
Let b0 be the bid profile in which Player 2 bids 1 + ǫ on item 1, all other bids are 0. That is,
b0 = (a1,0, a2,1, a3,0). Suppose that the order of updates is first player 1 gets to update his bid, then
player 2, and then player 3.
Player 1 is already playing a best response to b0−1, so b
1 = b0. Now, to get b2, player 2 updates
his bids to a best-response to b1−2, which is a
2,3. That is, he bids zero on the first two items and
1 + 3ǫ on the third. So b2 = (a1,0, a2,3, a3,0). With these bids, however, bidding 0 on all items is a
best-response of player 3, therefore b3 = b2.
Observe that SW (b3) = DW (b3) = 1 + 3ǫ, whereas the optimal social welfare is 3 + 2ǫ. The
claim follows by letting ǫ tend to zero.
D Proof of Theorem 5.1
In this appendix we provide additional details for the proof of Theorem 5.1. We first prove
Lemma 5.2. Afterwards, we state and prove Lemma D.1.
D.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2
For a fixed T , let yj = maxt≤T maxi b
t
i,j and p
t
j = maxi b
t
i,j for t ≤ T . We first show that for all
x > 0
Pr [yj ≥ x] ≤
(
1− 1
n
)−T
Pr
[
pTj ≥ x
]
(1)
To show (1), we use that yj is defined to be maxt′≤T p
t′
j . That is, if yj ≥ x, there has to be
a t′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T} for which p1j < x, . . . , pt
′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x. Note that for different t′ these are
disjoint events, so
Pr [yj ≥ x] =
T∑
t′=0
Pr
[
p1j < x, . . . , p
t′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x
]
.
Let us fix t′ and consider the event that p1j < x, . . . , p
t′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x. If t′ > 0, in step t′ a player
i has been selected that whose bid has set pt
′
j ≥ x; if t′ = 0, the initial bid of some player i on item
j is at least x. We have have pTj < x only if this player i is selected to update his bid in steps
t′ + 1, . . . , T . This happens with probability 1− (1− 1n)T−t′ ≤ 1− (1− 1n)T . Formally, we have
Pr
[
pTj < x
∣∣∣ p1j < x, . . . , pt′−1j < x, pt′j ≥ x
]
≤ 1−
(
1− 1
n
)T
.
This implies
Pr
[
pTj ≥ x, p1j < x, . . . , pt
′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x
]
≥
(
1− 1
n
)T
Pr
[
p1j < x, . . . , p
t′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x
]
.
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We thus obtain
Pr [yj ≥ x] =
T∑
t′=0
Pr
[
p1j < x, . . . , p
t′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x
]
≤
(
1− 1
n
)−T T∑
t′=0
Pr
[
pTj ≥ x, p1j < x, . . . , pt
′−1
j < x, p
t′
j ≥ x
]
=
(
1− 1
n
)−T
Pr
[
pTj ≥ x
]
.
This concludes the proof of (1).
To show the lemma, let ǫ > 0. We use that the expectation of a non-negative random variable
X can be approximated by
∑∞
k=0 ǫ ·Pr [X ≥ k · ǫ] ≤ E [X] ≤
∑∞
k=1 ǫ ·Pr [X ≥ k · ǫ]. Applying this
approximation and using (1), we get
E
[
pTj
] ≥
∞∑
k=1
ǫPr
[
pTj ≥ kǫ
]
≥
∞∑
k=0
(
1− 1
n
)T
ǫPr [yj ≥ kǫ]− ǫ
≥
(
1− 1
n
)T
E [yj]− ǫ .
As this holds for all ǫ > 0, we also have
E
[
pTj
] ≥
(
1− 1
n
)T
E [yj] .
D.2 Lemma D.1 and Its Proof
Next we state and prove Lemma D.1, which we used in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Lemma D.1. Let S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n be any feasible allocation, in which player i receives items S
∗
i . Con-
sider a sequence b0, . . . , bT in which each player from N ′ updates his bid at least once using an
α-aggressive bid. We have (α+ 1) ·DW (bT ) + α ·∑j∈M maxt≤T maxi bti,j ≥ α ·∑i∈N ′ vi(S∗i ).
To prove this lemma we need the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma D.2. Consider a sequence b0, . . . , bT in which bidders from N ′ update their bid at least
once. For i ∈ N ′, let ti denote the time of the last update for bidder i. Then,
∑
i∈N ′ u
D
i (b
ti) ≤
DW (bT ).
Proof. Without loss of generality, let N ′ = {1, . . . , n′} and t1 < t2 < . . . < tn′ . Consider any i ∈ N ′
and let bidder i’s update buy him the set of items S′. Then
uDi (b
ti) =
∑
j∈S′
(
btii,j −max
k 6=i
btik,j
)
.
For i ∈ N ′, let zij = maxk<i btik,j for all j, z0j = 0. That is, zij is the highest “final” bid on item j.
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We observe that ∑
j∈S′
(btii,j −max
k 6=i
btik,j) ≤
∑
j∈M
(zij − zi−1j ) .
This is for the following fact. For j 6∈ S′, we have zij ≥ zi−1j by definition. For j ∈ S′, btii,j = zij and
maxk 6=i b
ti
k,j ≥ maxk<i btik,j = maxk<i bti−1k,j = zi−1j .
By summing over all bidders i ∈ N ′, we obtain
∑
i∈N ′
uDi (b
ti) ≤
∑
i∈N ′
∑
j∈M
(zij − zi−1j ).
The double sum is telescoping and zTj = z
t
n′
j = maxk≤n′ b
T
k,j ≤ maxk bTk,j and z0j = 0 by
definition. So, ∑
i∈N ′
uDi (b
ti) ≤
∑
j∈M
(zTj − z0j ) =
∑
j∈M
max
k
bTk,j = DW (b
T ) .
We are now ready to prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma D.1. For i ∈ N ′, let ti denote the last time player i updates his bid. Instead of
choosing bid btii , he could have bought the set of items S
∗
i . As b
ti
i is α-aggressive, we get
uDi (b
ti) ≥ α ·
(
vi(S
∗
i )−
∑
j∈S∗
i
max
k 6=i
btik,j
)
.
Let yj = maxtmaxk b
t
k,j.
We thus have
uDi (b
ti) + α ·
∑
j∈S∗
i
yj ≥ α · vi(S∗i ) .
Summing this inequality over all bidders i ∈ N ′ yields
∑
i∈N ′
uDi (b
ti) + α ·
∑
i∈N ′
∑
j∈S∗
i
yj ≥ α ·
∑
i∈N ′
vi(S
∗
i ) .
The first sum is at most DW (bT ) by Lemma D.2. The double sum covers each j ∈M at most
once, therefore it is bounded by
∑
j∈M yj . Consequently,
DW (bT ) + α ·
∑
j∈M
yj ≥ α ·
∑
i∈N ′
vi(S
∗
i ) .
E Proof of Theorem 5.3
Our proof of Theorem 5.3 combines the construction that we used to prove Proposition 5.4 with
the following exponential lower-bound construction.
Lemma E.1 (Theorem 3.4 of [7]). For every k there is an instance with two players, A and B, and
k items, with fractionally subadditive valuations vA and vB defined by additive functions (a
t
A)t∈N
and (atB)t∈N such that in the Potential Procedure, started from initial bid vector b
0 in which both
players bid zero and with player A making the first move, player z ∈ {A,B} plays atz the t-th time
he gets to update his bid and it takes at least Ω(2k) steps before the procedure converges.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3. As in the proof of Proposition 5.4 we use n players, we start with the initial
bid vector b0 in which all players bid zero, and we consider player 1 being activated in every odd
step and the remaining players being activated in round-robin fashion in even steps.
We use m = (n − 1) · (k + 1) items. Items 1, . . . , n − 1 are used to mimic the sequence
of Proposition 5.4. The remaining items are grouped into n − 1 sets of size k, namely Ci :=
{n− 1 + (i− 2)k + 1, . . . , n− 1 + (i− 1)k} for i > 2, and on each of these sets player 1 follows the
steps of the exponential-length sequence of Lemma E.1 with one of the other n − 1 players, with
player 1 taking the role of player A and player i > 1 taking the role of player B.
To define the valuations, for z ∈ {A,B}, i = 2, . . . , n, and t ≥ 1, let atz,i be the additive
valuation functions defined in Lemma E.1 that are used by player z ∈ {A,B} after the t-th update,
using the items Ci.
We first define the valuation function vi for players i > 1. Namely, given some ǫ > 0, let the
valuation function vi of player i > 1 be defined as
vi(S) = max{1i−1∈S , ǫ ·max
t
atB,i(S)} .
That is, player i has a high value to buy item i − 1. He also has a very small value for items Ci
according to the valuations of player B in the exponential lower-bound construction using the items
Ci.
For player 1, we define the valuation function by setting v1(S) = maxt v
t
1(S), where v
t
1 is the
additive valuation function that is used when player 1 updates his bid for the t-th time. It is
designed in such a way that the t-th update is a best response in the game on Ci with player
i = (t − 1) mod (n − 1) + 1, who has just updated his bid, and makes the bid of bidder 1 move
from item i− 1 to i, which bidder i+ 1 is interested in, who will be activated next.
To define vt1 formally, observe that when player 1 makes his t-th update, some of the other
players have performed ⌈ tn−1⌉ updates so far, the others only ⌊ tn−1⌋. Let the respective sets of
players be denoted by N ′(t) and N ′′(t). Based on this, define
vt1(S) = (1 + ǫ) · 1(t−1) mod (n−1)+1∈S + ǫ ·
∑
i∈N ′(t)
a
⌈ t
n−1
⌉
A,i (S) + ǫ ·
∑
i∈N ′′(t)
a
⌊ t
n−1
⌋
A,i (S) .
By these definitions, the bids on items 1, . . . , n − 1 change exactly the way as in the proof of
Proposition 5.4 as long as there are still changes on items Ci for i > 1. By Lemma E.1 it takes
at least Ω(2k) updates until such a set Ci reaches a stable state. Therefore, our constructed best-
response sequence has low welfare at least until every player 2, . . . , n has updated his bid at least
Ω(2k) times. Moreover, every update is the unique best response.
F Negative Result for MPH-k Valuations
The maximum over positive hypergraph-k or MPH-k hierarchy [17] comprises valuation functions
with different degrees of complementarity, as parametrized by k. A valuation function vi belongs
to MPH-k if there are values vℓi,T ≥ 0 such that vi(S) = maxℓ
∑
T⊆S,|T |≤k v
ℓ
i,T . Any (monotone)
valuation function can be captured with k = m. Fractionally subadditive valuations are precisely
the case k = 1.
Observe that for a usual valuation function even in MPH-2, the only bids that fulfill strong no-
overbidding are zero on every item. Therefore, it is not possible that bidders bid α-aggressively for
α > 0 and satisfy no-overbidding in the strong sense at the same time. However, as our dynamics
in Section 2.2 demonstrates, strong no-overbidding is not a necessary requirement for good welfare
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guarantees. Unfortunately, the case is different for MPH-k. Below we show a negative result for
the valuation class MPH-3. It relies on ties regarding identical bids and multiple best responses
being broken to the disadvantage of the dynamics.
Proposition F.1. There are valuation functions for n bidders on O(n) items that belong to MPH-3
such that round-robin best-response dynamics only reach states that achieve a O( 1n)-fraction of the
optimal social welfare.
Proof. For a given k, we define an instance with k+ 4 items and 2k + 4 bidders as follows. Bidder
i ∈ [k−1] has a valuation of 3 for the bundles {i, k+1, k+2} and {i, k+3, k+4}, with no value for
the subsets. Bidder k has a valuation of 3 for the bundles {k, k+1, k+3} and {k, k+2, k+4}, with
no value for the subsets. Furthermore, there are k+4 bidders k+1, . . . , 2k+4, each of which has a
valuation of 1 for exactly one (distinct) item j ∈ [k+4]. Note that due to bidders k+1, . . . , 2k+4,
the optimal social welfare is k+ 4. Our best-response sequence will never reach a state with social
welfare higher than 3.
We assume that ties are broken as follows. Bidders k + 1, . . . , 2k + 4 never get an item if there
is an equal bid from a bidder i ∈ [k]. Among the bidders i ∈ [k], on items k+1 and k+3, bidder k
is preferred to k− 1, bidder k− 1 to k− 2, and so on. On items k+2 and k+4, bidders i ∈ [k− 1]
are preferred to bidder k, bidder k − 1 is preferred to k − 2, bidder k − 2 to k − 3, and so on.
Now consider the round-robin best-response dynamics in which bidders get activated in the order
they are indexed. Throughout the bidding dynamics bidders k+1, . . . , 2k+4 will bid truthfully on
their respective items. The other bidders bid as follows. In odd rounds bidders i = 1, . . . , k−1 buy
items {i, k+1, k+2}, bidding 1 on each of them. Afterwards, bidder k buys items {k, k+1, k+3},
again bidding 1 on each of them. In even rounds, bidders i = 1, . . . , k−1 buy items {i, k+3, k+4},
bidding 1 each, making bidder k buy items {k, k + 2, k + 4}.
Note that at every point in this sequence, only the bidder that has just updated his bid gets a
bundle of items of any positive value. This value is 3.
G Lazy Updates
In this appendix we show that our results also transfer to the case in which updates are lazy. That
is, a bidder may also choose not to update the bids when he is already playing a best response
given the current other bids. It is now important to assume that bid updates are zero for items
that are not won and that no item is ever won with bid zero. We will consider the points in time
when each bidder has performed at least one α-aggressive update.
Theorem G.1. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with lazy α-aggressive bid updates the
social welfare at any time step t after which each bidder has performed at least one α-aggressive
update satisfies SW (bt) ≥ α(1+2α+β)β · OPT (v).
To prove this theorem, we use variants of Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 that do not rely on eager updates.
Note that Lemma 3.6 does not rely on α-aggressive updates and therefore continues to hold in the
case of lazy updates. Our first lemma generalizes Lemma 3.4.
Lemma G.2. Let S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n be any feasible allocation, in which player i receives items S
∗
i . Con-
sider a round-robin sequence b0, . . . , bT in which each player updates his bid at least once using
an α-aggressive bid and may be lazy afterwards. We have (2α + 1) · DW (bT ) + α · DW (bT−n) ≥
α ·∑i∈N ′ vi(S∗i ).
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Proof. Let ti denote the last time player i updates his bid and t
′
i denote the last time he is offered
to update the bid. Let the set bought at time ti be Si, the set that is still won at time t
′
i be S
′
i ⊆ Si.
Instead of choosing bid btii , he could have bought the set of items S
′. As btii is α-aggressive, we get
uDi (b
ti) ≥ α ·
(
vi(S
′
i)−
∑
j∈S′
i
max
k 6=i
btik,j
)
.
The declared utility at time t′i is given by
uDi (b
t′
i) =
∑
j∈S′
i
(
btii,j −max
k 6=i
b
t′
i
k,j
)
.
In combination, we get
uDi (b
ti) + αuDi (b
t′
i) ≥ α ·
(
vi(S
′
i)−
∑
j∈S′
i
max
k 6=i
btik,j +
∑
j∈S′
i
btii,j −
∑
j∈S′
i
max
k 6=i
b
t′
i
k,j
)
= αui(b
t′
i) + α ·
(∑
j∈S′
i
btii,j −
∑
j∈S′
i
max
k 6=i
btik,j
)
≥ αui(bt′i) ,
where in the last step we use that for every j ∈ S′i ⊆ Si the update sets btii,j ≥ maxk 6=i btik,j.
At t′i, bidder i could buy the set S
∗
i instead. Therefore
ui(b
t′
i) ≥ vi(S∗i )−
∑
j∈S∗
i
max
k 6=i
b
t′
i
k,j .
We set ptj = maxi b
t
i,j. As T − n+ 1 ≤ t′i ≤ T , we have pt
′
i
j ≤ pTj + pT−nj by the same argument
as in the proof of Lemma 3.4 and thus
uDi (b
ti) + αuDi (b
t′
i) + α ·
∑
j∈S∗
i
(pTj + p
T−n
j ) ≥ α · vi(S∗i ) .
Summing this inequality over all bidders i ∈ N yields
∑
i∈N
(uDi (b
ti) + αuDi (b
t′
i)) + α ·
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈S∗
i
(pTj + p
T−n
j ) ≥ α ·
∑
i∈N
vi(S
∗
i ) .
The first sum is at most (1 + α)DW (bT ) by Lemma D.2. The double sum covers each j ∈ M
at most once, therefore it is bounded by DW (bT−n) +DW (bT ). Consequently
(1 + α)DW (bn) + α · (DW (bT−n) +DW (bT )) ≥ α ·
∑
i∈N
vi(S
∗
i ) .
The second lemma generalizes Lemma 3.5.
Lemma G.3. Consider a β-safe bid sequence b0, . . . , bn in which player i changes his bid from bi−1
to bi using an α-aggressive bid or keeps it unchanged. Then, DW (bT ) ≥ αβ ·DW (bT−n).
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that T = n. Otherwise shift the indices accordingly.
Consider an arbitrary bidder i and his update from bi−1 to bi. We claim that
DW (bi) ≥ DW (bi−1)−
(
β
α
− 1
)
· uDi (bi) . (2)
Observe that if bidder i keeps his bid unchanged, DW (bi) = DW (bi−1) and therefore (2) holds
trivially. So, let us consider the case that bidder i updates the bid α-aggressively. Denote the set
of items that bidder i won under bids bi−1 by Si−1i , and the set of items that he wins under bids b
i
by Sii . So
uDi (b
i−1) =
∑
j∈Si−1
i
bi−1i,j −
∑
j∈Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j and u
D
i (b
i) =
∑
j∈Si
i
bii,j −
∑
j∈Si
i
max
k 6=i
bik,j .
Using that for all k 6= i and all j we have bi−1k,j = bik,j we obtain that the difference in declared
welfare over all bidders between steps i − 1 and i is equal to the difference in bidder i’s declared
utility at these time steps. Formally,
DW (bi) =
∑
j∈M\Si
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si
i
bii,j
=
∑
j∈M
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si
i
bii,j −
∑
j∈Si
i
max
k 6=i
bik,j
=
∑
j∈M
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j + u
D
i (bi)
=
∑
j∈M\Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j + u
D
i (bi)
=
∑
j∈M\Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j +
∑
j∈Si−1
i
bi−1i,j + u
D
i (bi)−
∑
j∈Si−1
i
bi−1i,j +
∑
j∈Si−1
i
max
k 6=i
bi−1k,j
= DW (bi−1) + uDi (bi)− uDi (bi−1) .
Since bii is α-aggressive, we have u
D
i (b
i) ≥ α · ui(bi−1). Since the bidding sequence is β-safe,
uDi (b
t) ≤ β · ui(bt) for all t. So,
DW (bi) = DW (bi−1) + uDi (b
i)− uDi (bi−1)
≥ DW (bi−1) + uDi (bi)− β · ui(bi−1)
≥ DW (bi−1) + uDi (bi)−
β
α
· uDi (bi)
= DW (bi−1)−
(
β
α
− 1
)
· uDi (bi) .
This implies that (2) also holds in this case.
Summing (2) over all bidders i ∈ N and using the telescoping sum∑i∈N (DW (bi)−DW (bi−1) =
DW (bn)−DW (b0) we obtain
DW (bn) ≥ DW (b0)−
(
β
α
− 1
)∑
i∈N
uDi (b
i) .
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Since α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 1 the factor (β/α− 1) ≥ 0. We can therefore use Lemma 3.3 to conclude that
DW (bn) ≥ DW (b0)−
(
β
α
− 1
)
DW (bn) .
This implies the claim.
Proof of Theorem G.1. Combining Lemma G.2 with Lemma G.3 to the allocation S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n that
maximizes social welfare we obtain
(1 + 2α+ β) ·DW (bt) = (2α + 1) ·DW (bt) + α · β
α
DW (bt)
≥ (2α + 1) ·DW (bt) + α ·DW (bt−n−1) ≥ α · OPT (v).
Now, by Lemma 3.6, DW (bt) ≤ β ·SW (bt). Combining this with the previous inequality yields
(1 + 2α+ β) · β · SW (bt) ≥ α ·OPT (v).
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